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INTRODUCTION 
Involuntary commitment case law continues to demonstrate that 
mental illness is not only a physical and psychological affliction, but 
also a de facto legal status.1  Suffering from or being diagnosed with—
that is, being alleged to have—a mental illness makes one eligible for 
involuntary treatment, including inpatient commitment tantamount in 
many ways to incarceration.2  The key difference between 
incarceration and commitment is that a person must be adjudged 
beyond a reasonable doubt to have actually committed a crime to be 
incarcerated for a set period, whereas members of a select, frequently 
institutionalized class, the mentally disabled, may be confined 
indefinitely upon a physician’s assessment that they may at some 
future date commit a harmful act.3  Mental disabilities affect a 
remarkably broad range of New Yorkers: a recent survey by the New 
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) 
found that 430,000 New Yorkers—7.3% of the City’s population—
suffered from a major depressive disorder, and 200,000 or 3.5% of the 
City’s population suffered from a generalized anxiety disorder.4  
 
 1. This Note will try to refer to whatever facts courts include regarding the 
reasons why a person has been committed, in order to give a practical sense of what it 
“takes” to be involuntarily committed.  This is intended partly to support the 
proposition that otherwise innocuous or sympathetic behavior can become a pretext 
for “fenc[ing] in . . . those whose ways are different.” See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 
422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975); see also Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice 
Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law 
Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 13 (1999) (remarking that 
cases and statutes, taken at face value, tell us “virtually nothing” about “how mental 
disability law is actually applied . . . and why it is applied that way”). 
 2. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (describing involuntary 
commitment as a “massive curtailment of liberty” requiring due process protection).  
In addition to losing their freedom from physical restraint, committees lose their First 
and Fourth Amendment rights as well as have their right to object to medication 
severely restricted. See, e.g., Cooper v. Sharp, No. 10-5245 (FSH), 2011 WL 1045234, 
at *8–10 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2011) (describing the “limited” rights of involuntary 
committees to be free from searches and mail screening); see also Mills v. Rogers, 457 
U.S. 291, 299 n.16 (1982) (involuntary patients’ interest in objecting to medication 
limited by state interests). 
 3. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 4. Division of Mental Hygiene, NYC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & MENTAL 
HYGIENE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/dmh/dmh-mental_illness.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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Another 6.3% reported “nonspecific psychological distress.”5  Even 
more troubling, a 2005 DOHMH survey of teenagers found that 9.6% 
of respondents had attempted suicide within the past twelve months.6  
Under current state law standards, any of these conditions could 
make one eligible for involuntary civil commitment.7  State law 
designates twenty-seven hospitals for inpatient treatment of mental 
illness under the direction of the Office of Mental Health (OMH).8  A 
2009 report by OMH indicated that 173,682 New Yorkers were 
receiving treatment in residential OMH programs, including 12,853 in 
inpatient residential treatment facilities.9  Despite the fact that mental 
disability affects an enormous percentage of its population, New York 
State’s statutory scheme for involuntary confinement of the mentally 
disabled, Mental Hygiene Law Article 910 (Article 9) is among the 
least rights-protective in the country, allocating an enormous amount 
of discretion to physicians.11  Periodically, patients and advocacy 
organizations have challenged this arrangement, but since the Second 
Circuit found Article 9 facially valid in Project Release v. Prevost,12 
District Courts have upheld it consistently.13 
This Note will examine New York State’s involuntary civil 
commitment statute, Mental Hygiene Law Article 9, in light of 
developments in the due process case law and scientific literature 
relating to involuntary commitment since the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals last heard a wholesale facial challenge to the statute in 
Project Release.  Part I will analyze New York State’s commitment 
law in its constitutional context.  Part I.A will analyze the 
constitutional framework around which New York’s statute is 
constructed, starting with the Supreme Court’s foundational rulings in 
O’Connor v. Donaldson,14 Addington v. Texas,15 and Vitek v. Jones,16 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See infra Part I.B.  The legal standards are codified in NEW YORK MENTAL 
HYGIENE LAW § 9.01. 
 8. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 7.17(b) (McKinney 2011). 
 9. See PCS Summary Reports—Survey Week 2009, N.Y. ST. OFFICE MENTAL 
HEALTH, http://bi.omh.ny.gov/pcs/Summary%20Reports?pageval=prog-res&yearval 
=2009 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
 10. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.01–9.63. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. 722 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 13. See, e.g., Kraft v. City of New York, 696 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 14. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 15. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 16. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
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and taking account of more recent developments in cases like Kansas 
v. Hendricks17 and United States v. Comstock.18  This Note will 
comment on the police and parens patriae powers that underpin 
different parts of the Mental Hygiene law, and the due process 
implications attendant on each.  Part I.B will break down the 
involuntary commitment statute section by section to illustrate how 
the legislature has attempted to meet minimum due process standards 
set out by the Supreme Court.  Part II will compare Article 9 and the 
state and federal case law interpreting it with other states’ involuntary 
commitment schemes and rights-protective judicial doctrines that 
courts interpreting these schemes have adopted.  Through this 
comparison, this Note concludes that New York’s commitment 
scheme is unusually under-protective of the rights of the mentally ill, 
leaving excessive discretion to psychiatrists and providing insufficient 
procedural protection, and that the inevitable result is 
unconstitutional over-commitment.19  Part II necessarily will revisit 
Project Release v. Prevost20 in detail, highlighting key areas of the 
Second Circuit’s reasoning that have been so undermined since the 
case was decided that the decision should be overturned or modified.  
In light of this conclusion, Part III proposes an increased role for 
Section 1983 and ADA Title II actions against psychiatrists and 
institutions.  This Note will consider how these case-by-case litigation-
based strategies, though not as effective as legislative action to amend 
Article 9 directly, have the potential to indirectly shape a more 
protective limiting norm and shield New York’s mentally ill from 
over-commitment. 
 
 17. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 18. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
 19. See Ruth E. Ross et al., A Framework for Classifying State Involuntary 
Commitment Statutes, 27 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH 341 (1996) (applying a 
statistical analysis to state mental facility admission rates, and finding that states with 
more stringent statutory guidelines for involuntary confinement had lower rates of 
admission).  “Over-commitment” is used in this Note as a term of art to refer to the 
commitment of mentally ill individuals who have been misdiagnosed as meeting the 
minimum constitutional requirement of “dangerousness to self or others.” See supra 
Part I.A.1. 
 20. 722 F.2d 960 (1983). 
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I.  ARTICLE 9 AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON 
CONFINEMENT 
A. The Federal Framework 
Prior to the 1970s, courts played a minimal role in the civil 
commitment process, leaving the standards and procedures by which 
patients could be confined against their will largely to the discretion 
of state legislatures and mental health professionals.21  In the early 
1970s, landmark civil rights cases like Wyatt v. Stickney22 and Lessard 
v. Schmidt23 ushered in a “de-institutionalization movement”24 in 
which state and federal courts, and eventually the United States 
Supreme Court,25 began to identify the procedural and substantive 
rights of individuals diagnosed as mentally disabled.  Throughout the 
1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court enunciated a general 
framework of minimum constitutional standards that state 
 
 21. See William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and 
Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment 
Process, 86 N.D. L. REV. 259, 260 (2010). 
 22. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
 23. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 
(1974), reinstated and enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other 
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
 24. See, e.g., Judge Reese McKinney, Jr., Involuntary Commitment, A Delicate 
Balance, 20 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 37 (2006) (briefly summarizing the 
movement).  According to some commentators, the “de-institutionalization 
movement” culminated in Congressional action to protect the rights of the mentally 
disabled. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Make Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the 
ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947 (1997) (discussing the 
Developmentally Disabled Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (2006), and the 
Protection and Advocacy for the Mentally Ill Act (PAMI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801–10851 
(2006)).  While these statutes gesture toward rights protection, they generally do not 
create privately enforceable rights. See id. at 948; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 8 (1981). 
 25. In one of the first Supreme Court cases to deal directly with the constitutional 
implications of involuntary commitment, Justice Blackmun observed, “Considering 
the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive 
constitutional limitations on this power have not been more frequently litigated.” 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 n.22 (1972) (citing a congressional report from 
1961 indicating that, at that time, “90% of the approximately 800,000 patients in 
mental hospitals in this country had been involuntarily committed”).  The Jackson 
Court, which dealt with a federal prisoner challenging his transfer to a mental facility, 
did not reach the question of substantive qualifications for commitment in the 
absence of a criminal conviction, but did observe that due process imposed limits on 
the state’s power to confine the mentally ill. Id. at 719, 736–38.  Justice Blackmun’s 
observation could be seen as “opening the courthouse door to persons with mental 
disabilities,” setting the stage for the subsequent “explosion of litigation” on 
involuntary commitment. Perlin, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
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involuntary commitment schemes must meet in order to protect those 
rights.26  This framework is oriented around two distinctions: first, the 
distinction between “dangerous” and “nondangerous” mental illness; 
and second, the distinction between a mentally disabled individual’s 
liberty interests and the general interests of society. 
1. Substantive limits—O’Connor, Addington, and the “Danger” 
Standard 
The first distinction comes from O’Connor v. Donaldson.27  
Kenneth Donaldson’s father committed him to the Florida State 
Hospital at Chattahoochee based on “scanty” evidence that 
Donaldson suffered from “delusions,” under a Florida statute that 
authorized commitment of anyone adjudged “incompetent by reason 
of mental illness.”28  Donaldson repeatedly but unsuccessfully 
demanded his release throughout nearly fifteen years of involuntary 
confinement before finally bringing a Section 1983 claim against the 
hospital for damages and injunctive relief.29  Upholding Donaldson’s 
claim, the Supreme Court held that “a State cannot constitutionally 
confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of 
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and 
responsible family members or friends.”30  Because the trial court had 
determined that Donaldson, even if mentally ill, was not dangerous to 
himself or others, the hospital had violated his constitutional right to 
freedom.31  Although this holding establishes the substantive right of 
“nondangerous” mentally ill (or allegedly mentally ill) individuals to 
live in “the private community,”32 the O’Connor Court expressly 
declined to decide “whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally 
ill person may be confined by the State on any of the grounds 
which . . . are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement 
of such a person—to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own 
survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness.”33 
Although O’Connor left the substantive and procedural 
requirements of lawful involuntary commitment to be resolved in 
 
 26. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 1, at 11. 
 27. 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). 
 28. Id. at 565–66 & n.2. 
 29. See id. at 565–66; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 30. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 575. 
 33. See id. at 573–74. 
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later cases, the Court did elaborate on the grounds upon which States 
might predicate commitment.  As implied by the justifications listed 
above, confinement generally rests on the police and/or parens 
patriae powers.34  The police power generally justifies confinement to 
protect others from the individual,35 while the parens patriae power 
justifies confinement for the protection of the individual from himself 
(or from his own inability to survive without state intervention).36  
Although the Court noted that these two powers are distinct and 
entail different due process limitations,37 it did not identify how those 
different limitations might affect the State’s power to confine.38  State 
civil commitment statutes, amended to comply with O’Connor’s 
“dangerousness” requirement, do not distinguish between the two 
justifications, and generally apply to anyone determined to be 
“dangerous to self or others.”39 
 
 34. See id. at 582–83 (Burger, J., concurring) (“[T]he States are vested with the 
historic parens patriae power, including the duty to protect ‘persons under legal 
disabilities to act for themselves’ . . . [t]he classic example of his role is when a State 
undertakes to act as ‘the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics.’” (citing 
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972))); see also id. at 575 (majority 
opinion). 
 35. See id. at 582–83 (“There can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police 
power a State may confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of 
significant antisocial acts or communicable disease.”); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). 
 36. See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 583 (Burger, J., concurring).  New York State 
explicitly announces its parens patriae power over the mentally disabled in its 
constitution. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 4; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 7.01 
(McKinney 2011); id. § 9.47 (stating that it is the duty of local officers to see that “all 
mentally ill persons within their respective communities who are in need of care and 
treatment at a hospital” receive such treatment); id. § 9.21(a) (standing for the 
proposition that it is “the duty of all state and local officers having duties to perform 
relating to the mentally ill to encourage any person suitable therefor and in need of 
care and treatment for mental illness to apply for admission as a voluntary or 
informal patient”). 
 37. See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 583 (Burger, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of 
alternative forms of protection may be motivated by different considerations, and the 
justifications for one may not be invoked to rationalize another.”). 
 38. The Court did, however, identify certain specific limitations on states’ parens 
patriae power. See id. at 575 (majority opinion) (“[W]hile the State may arguably 
confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary 
condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in 
freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends.”); id. at 583 (Burger, J., 
concurring) (“At a minimum, a particular scheme for protection of the mentally ill 
must rest upon a legislative determination that it is compatible with the best interests 
of the affected class and that its members are unable to act for themselves.”). 
 39. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.37, 9.39 (McKinney 2011).  New 
York’s standards of dangerousness are compared with those of other states’ in Part 
II, infra. 
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Significantly, Justice Burger’s concurrence also recognized the 
difficulty involved in both defining “mental illness” and diagnosing 
individuals as “dangerous.”40  How these terms are defined is 
obviously vital to giving O’Connor’s holding meaning, but because 
both issues had been resolved by the jury below, the O’Connor court 
did not address them further.41 
The second major distinction underlying the constitutional 
framework for civil commitment is the one between the liberty 
interests of mentally disabled individuals and the interests of society 
at large.42  In a civil commitment hearing, these interests must be 
balanced by allocating the risk of an erroneous commitment between 
the individual and the State.43  In Addington, a woman committed her 
son, a man with a history of “mental and emotional difficulties,” after 
he had an “assaultive episode” and damaged property.44  Challenging 
his commitment before a jury, Addington conceded that he suffered 
from mental illness but claimed that the State had not presented 
sufficient evidence to establish that he was dangerous.45  The court 
instructed the jury that Addington could be committed if the medical 
testimony constituted “clear and convincing evidence” that he 
required hospitalization, and the jury found that this burden had been 
met.46  On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected Addington’s argument 
that the “clear and convincing” standard of proof inadequately 
protected him from the risk of an erroneous finding of 
dangerousness.47  In so doing, the Court distinguished the interests at 
play in criminal proceedings, which require the state to establish 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, from those in civil commitments.48  
 
 40. See 422 U.S. at 584 & n.6 (Burger, J., concurring) (citing Thomas Szasz, The 
Right to Health, 57 GEO. L.J. 734 (1969)). 
 41. Id. at 573–74. 
 42. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“In considering what 
standard should govern in a civil commitment proceeding, we must assess both the 
extent of the individual’s interest in not being involuntarily confined indefinitely and 
the state’s interest in committing the emotionally disturbed under a particular 
standard of proof.”). 
 43. Id. at 423. 
 44. Id. at 420–21. 
 45. Id.  The State called two physicians, each of whom expressed the opinion that 
Addington suffered from “psychotic schizophrenia” with “paranoid tendencies,” was 
“probably dangerous to himself and to others,” and required “hospitalization in a 
closed area.” Id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. at 432–33. 
 48. Id. at 423. 
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The standard of proof represents not only the value that society 
places on an individual’s liberty,49 but also the weight of the state’s 
interest in confinement.  By applying the “clear and convincing” 
standard of proof, the Court simultaneously held that the interest that 
a nondangerous mentally disabled individual has in remaining free 
from unnecessary restraint is weaker than that of an innocent 
individual accused of a crime,50 and that the state’s interest in 
confining the mentally disabled is qualitatively different from its 
interest in confining criminals.51 
O’Connor and Addington establish the two basic axes.  Mentally ill 
individuals cannot be confined unless they reach a certain threshold 
of dangerousness, achieved either by posing a sufficient threat to 
society to justify the exercise of state police power or by being 
sufficiently incapable of caring for themselves to justify an exercise of 
state parens patriae power.52  The sufficiency of that showing of 
 
 49. Id. at 425. 
 50. See id. at 428–29.  This conclusion is premised on the assumption that the 
mentally disabled, unlike the wrongly convicted, stand to gain from their 
confinement. See id. at 430 (observing that the difficulty in predicting dangerousness 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” could force fact finders to “reject commitment for 
many patients desperately in need of institutionalized psychiatric care” and that 
“[s]uch ‘freedom’ for a mentally ill person would be purchased at a high price”).  The 
court also assumes that “the layers of professional review and observation of the 
patient’s condition, and the concern of family and friends generally will provide 
continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be corrected.” Id. at 428–
29.  This observation ignores the possibility that “professional review” may be tainted 
by treatment bias. See infra Part II.B.2.  It also overlooks the fact that it was 
Addington’s own mother who had him committed. 
 51. See id. at 428 (“In a civil commitment [as opposed to a criminal proceeding] 
state power is not exercised in a punitive sense.”).  Comparative benevolence thus 
grants the state broader license to confine. 
 52. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).  The Court later 
clarified that O’Connor and Addington established mental illness and danger as 
separate prerequisites to civil confinement, both of which must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75–76, 86 (1992) 
(holding that due process does not allow an individual with an “antisocial 
personality,” who has been adjudged dangerous, to be involuntarily committed 
absent a showing of some treatable mental illness).  A “sane” person who has not 
committed a crime is thus ineligible for civil confinement regardless of how 
predictably dangerous he or she may be. See id. But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 358–60 (1997) (permitting commitment on a finding of dangerousness 
coupled with an untreatable “mental abnormality”).  Although Hendricks initially 
seems to abrogate the two-step Foucha standard, both the majority and dissent point 
out that Kansas’ definition of “abnormality” falls within the permissible range of 
definitions of “mental illness” for substantive due process purposes, which must only 
pertain to an individual’s ability to control his “dangerous” behavior. See id. at 359 
(majority opinion); id. at 373–74 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Kansas v. Crane, 
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dangerousness is determined by balancing the state’s interest in 
confining the genuinely dangerous against the liberty interest of 
individuals who may be confined erroneously.  To some extent, this 
balance allocates the risk of over-commitment to the mentally 
disabled population.53 
O’Connor and Addington intersect at the concept of 
“dangerousness.”54  Under this standard, a commitment is legitimate 
if a fact finder (either a physician certifying an initial commitment or 
a judge or jury at a recommitment hearing)55 can conclude that there 
is clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual is 
dangerous.  Legislatures authorizing civil commitment through 
statutes like Article 9 must work within those bounds, but their 
contours remain vague.56  What, for example, makes a person 
 
534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002) (clarifying that Kansas v. Hendricks requires a showing of 
some, but not “total,” lack of control to establish “mental illness” for civil 
confinement purposes). But see Brian J. Pollock, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: A 
Workable Standard for “Mental Illness” or a Push Down the Slippery Slope Toward 
State Abuse of Civil Commitment?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 321–22 & n.17 (1998) 
(arguing that the Court’s increased deference to legislatures’ definition of “mental 
illness” detaches civil commitment “from the medical model of illness and bona fide 
treatment” and could lead to abuse of states’ confinement powers (quoting John Q. 
La Fond, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the 
Theraputic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 698–99 
(1992))). 
 53. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.  The Court has recognized that erroneously 
confined individuals suffer not only from arbitrary confinement, but also from stigma 
and a variety of other adverse consequences. See id. at 425–26; see also Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a 
mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of 
the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, 
constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections.”).  
These “deprivations of liberty” are described with specificity in Part I.B infra. 
 54. Justice Brennan summarized the complex balancing of interests embodied in 
this concept in Jones v. United States:  
The core of both cases [O’Connor and Addington] is a balance of three 
factors: the governmental interest in isolating and treating those who may 
be mentally ill and dangerous; the difficulty of proving or disproving mental 
illness and dangerousness in court; and the massive intrusion on individual 
liberty that involuntary psychiatric hospitalization entails. 
463 U.S. 354, 372 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 55. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 56. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 431 (“The essence of federalism is that states must 
be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a 
common, uniform mold.  As the substantive standards for civil commitment may vary 
from state to state, procedures must be allowed to vary so long as they meet the 
constitutional minimum.”); see also La Fond, supra note 52 (describing the dangers 
of leaving excessive discretion to legislatures to define the terms of confinement). But 
see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968) (noting, with regard to a state 
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“dangerous” within the standard’s definition?  Clear and convincing 
evidence of “dangerousness” is required under Addington, but can a 
psychiatric prognosis alone be “clear and convincing”?  As Part III of 
this Note will demonstrate, each state’s civil commitment statute 
resolves these questions differently. 
2. Procedural Limits—Vitek v. Jones. 
In Vitek v. Jones,57 the Court established the minimum procedural 
protections required for involuntary commitment, without further 
clarifying the substantive O’Connor dangerousness standard.  Vitek 
dealt with a prisoner58 convicted of robbery who, one year into a 
three-to-nine year sentence, had been transferred without notice or 
hearing to an inpatient mental facility to be committed until no longer 
dangerous.59  The Court held that despite requiring a finding of 
dangerousness (by a prison psychiatrist), the Nebraska statute 
imposed “the kind of deprivations of liberty that require[d] 
procedural protections.”60  Specifically, due process requires: (1) 
notice; (2) a hearing with the opportunity to rebut evidence relied on 
for the transfer; (3) the ability to present and cross-examine 
witnesses; (4) the ability to appear before an independent decision-
maker; (5) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence 
relied on for transfer; and (6) effective and timely notice of all the 
 
insanity defense standard, that “[n]othing could be less fruitful than for this Court to 
be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms . . . .  It is 
simply not yet the time to write the Constitutional formulas cast in terms whose 
meaning . . . is not yet clear either to doctors or to lawyers.”). 
 57. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
 58. While this case, like Jackson v. Indiana, dealt with the commitment of a 
convicted prisoner, the Court pointed out that involuntary commitment represents a 
“massive curtailment of liberty” that is qualitatively different from incarceration. Id. 
at 491 (citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982) (“Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals 
whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”).  Because being classified 
as mentally ill entails stigmatization and compulsory behavior modification 
treatment, neither prisoners nor ordinary citizens can be committed without the due 
process protections the Vitek Court went on to define. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493; see 
also Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1061 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 59. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 484.  Vitek was found to be “suffering from a mental 
illness” by prison psychiatrists after setting fire to his mattress while in solitary 
confinement. Id. 
 60. Id. at 494. 
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foregoing rights.61  A plurality of Justices also found that independent, 
state-funded counsel must be provided for indigent committees.62 
The Vitek Court reiterated the underlying balance of interests 
between patient and state and acknowledged that the procedural 
protections it adopted were necessary to safeguard against the risk of 
being “arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to 
unwelcome treatment.”63  Significantly, the Court highlighted the 
importance of independent fact-finders and adversary hearings in 
what could be seen as an “essentially medical” inquiry into mental 
illness.64  Qualifying the Addington Court’s observation that 
diagnoses of mental illness “turn[] on the meaning of the facts which 
must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists,”65 the 
majority held that “[i]t is precisely ‘[t]he subtleties and nuances of 
psychiatric diagnoses’ that justify the requirement of adversary 
hearings” with independent decision-makers.66  In a case where a jury 
had not already made an assessment of dangerousness—unlike in 
O’Connor or Addington—the Court was moved to observe that due 
process cannot be satisfied where all fact-finding is left to 
unconstrained medical discretion.67 
 
 61. See id. at 494–96. 
 62. See id. at 496–97.  The plurality, led by Justice White, found that indigent 
prisoners thought to be suffering from “mental disease or defect” were likely to be 
unable to understand or exercise their rights, making state-funded counsel 
appropriate. Id.  Justice Powell agreed that appointed assistance should be provided 
at pre-transfer hearings, but that due process did not require that assistance to come 
from “a licensed attorney.” See id. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 495 (majority opinion). 
 64. See id. 
 65. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (emphasis omitted). 
 66. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 495 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 430). 
 67. But cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (holding that 
“treatment decisions” made by medical professionals are “presumptively valid,” and 
should only be “second-guessed” by judges and juries if they are “a substantial 
departure from accepted professional judgment”); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 544 (1979) (“[Courts] should not ‘second-guess the expert administrators on 
matters on which they are better informed.’” (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 
124 (2d Cir 1978))).  The Youngberg case dealt with the “post-commitment” liberty 
interests of institutionalized individuals, and its presumption of validity was not 
discussed in the context of a commitment decision or dangerousness finding. See 
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324; see also Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the 
“Experts”: From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment 
Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 667–69 (1992) (distinguishing between the pre-
commitment “negative right” to be free from constraint and Youngberg’s “positive 
right” to treatment in a psychiatric institution, and determining that professional 
judgment is only relevant when establishing whether the latter has been adequately 
protected). 
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Since Vitek, the Court has not significantly revisited the 
substantive or procedural limitations on involuntary commitment.  
Although the extent to which states can define “dangerousness” has 
been litigated frequently since the early 1980s, the Court’s minor 
modifications to the O’Connor standard in Foucha v. Louisiana68 and 
Kansas v. Hendricks69 provide little additional guidance.70  In its most 
recent opinion dealing with civil commitment—interpreting a federal 
sex offender commitment statute—the Court explicitly left the states’ 
“leeway” untouched.71 
Each state legislature, including New York’s, has dealt differently 
with “dangerousness” and the minimum procedural requirements for 
civil commitment.72  Having identified the intentionally indistinct 
constitutional framework on which it rests, the next section will 
examine Article 9 itself.  A provision-by-provision breakdown will 
help reveal the extent to which the state legislature has used 
 
 68. See 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
 69. See 521 U.S. 346 (1997); see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) 
(clarifying Hendricks). 
 70. See, e.g., Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 (“[T]he Constitution’s safeguards of human 
liberty in the area of mental illness and the law are not always best enforced through 
precise bright-line rules.  For one thing, the States retain considerable leeway in 
defining the mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an individual 
eligible for commitment.”). 
 71. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (“In resolving 
that question [whether a statute authorizing commitment of individuals who (1) have 
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct, (2) currently suffer from 
a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder, and (3) are sexually dangerous to 
others], we assume, but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution—
such as the Due Process Clause—do not prohibit civil commitment in these 
circumstances.  In other words, we assume for argument’s sake that the Federal 
Constitution would permit a State to enact this statute . . . .” (citing Addington, 441 
U.S. 418 (1979))).  This language is particularly significant in light of the district 
court’s ruling that the showing of a past act or attempt of sexually violent conduct 
must be made beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by clear and convincing 
evidence, given that the proceeding could result in “the taking of an individual’s 
liberty.” See United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 552 (E.D.N.C. 2007), 
aff’d, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).  
The Supreme Court overturned the District Court on other grounds, declining an 
opportunity to overrule Addington. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956; see also Alex 
Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 254–55 
(2011) (lamenting that the Comstock Court missed an opportunity to reevaluate 
Addington in light of recent studies casting doubt on psychiatrists’ ability to make 
accurate predictions of dangerousness). 
 72. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.01 (McKinney 2011) (defining 
“likelihood to result in serious harm” to self or others for the purposes of Article 9 
commitments). 
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commitment standards to allocate the risk of erroneous commitment 
to New York’s mentally disabled population. 
B. How Article 9 Works 
There are, in general, three ways to be committed to an inpatient 
mental institution under New York law: voluntarily,73 involuntarily,74 
and through emergency commitment.75  Each entails a different set of 
procedures, forms, and minimum and maximum periods of 
confinement.76  The legal status under which a person is committed is 
recorded in his or her medical record77 and determines the type of 
program in which he or she can receive treatment.78  A committee’s 
status may change during his hospitalization, but any change in status 
entails its own set of assessments and procedures.79  This Part will deal 
with each statutory status separately. 
1. Voluntary Commitment 
Voluntary commitment can happen either informally80 or by 
application.81  Informal voluntary commitment is not terribly 
intrusive, requiring no written application and leaving the patient 
“free to leave . . . at any time.”82  Informal committees do not have 
 
 73. See id. §§ 9.13, 9.15. 
 74. See id. §§ 9.27, 9.37. 
 75. See id. §§ 9.39, 9.40. 
 76. A helpful chart laying out these different admission procedures can be found 
on the New York State Office of Mental Health’s (OMH) website, available at 
http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/forensic/manual/html/mhl_admissions.htm (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 77. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.03 (McKinney 2011); see also id. § 9.11 
(requiring patients’ records to be forwarded to Mental Hygiene Legal Service 
(MHLS)); id. § 33.13 (defining the required contents of a patient’s file, including any 
treatments and any restrictions on patient’s rights, and setting confidentiality 
requirements). 
 78. See, e.g., id. § 9.40 (special procedure for admission to a Comprehensive 
Psychiatric Emergency Program (CPEP)). 
 79. See, e.g., id. § 9.07 (requiring notice to patients of the statutory rights 
provided under each admission status); id. § 9.09 (requiring notice to MHLS within 
three days of any patient’s change of status or transfer to a different facility). 
 80. See id. § 9.15. 
 81. See id. § 9.13. 
 82. See id. § 9.15; see also Paradies v. Benedictine Hosp., 431 N.Y.S.2d 175 (App. 
Div. 3d Dep’t 1980) (finding, in wrongful death action by wife of a patient committed 
under § 9.15, that doctors were not liable because they had no right to retain him 
after he demanded release). 
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their records forwarded to the Mental Hygiene Legal Service83 
(“MHLS”) and need not satisfy any dangerousness standard.84  After 
requesting to be informally admitted, a prospective committee must 
be given notice (1) that the hospital to which he is requesting 
admission is a hospital for the mentally ill, (2) that he is applying for 
admission, and (3) of the possibility of and conditions for being 
converted to involuntary status.85  Any physician in the department 
can then examine the prospective committee to determine whether he 
meets the informal admission standard.86  At this juncture, the 
examining physician may commence procedures to have the person 
applying for informal admission committed pursuant to another, 
stricter section of Article 9—anything from voluntary to emergency 
commitment.87  Every twelve months following informal commitment, 
informal and voluntary committees must be reassessed to determine 
whether they continue to be in need of care and treatment and are 
willing to remain confined; this determination must be communicated 
to MHLS, which may request a hearing to challenge it.88  Once every 
120 days of hospitalization, the director must re-inform all voluntary 
and informal patients of their status and rights, at which time the 
patient must give written consent to continued hospitalization.89  
These patients are thus reappraised of their rights and given the 
opportunity to object to their commitment at least three times per 
year. 
Voluntary committees must meet the same “need for care and 
treatment” standard as informal committees but must make written 
application to the hospital director for voluntary status.90  The parent 
or guardian of a person under the age of eighteen can submit this 
application to request “voluntary” admission on the minor’s behalf.91  
 
 83. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.11. 
 84. See id. § 9.15 (“The director . . . may receive therein as an informal patient 
any suitable person in need of care and treatment requesting admission thereto.”).  
Section 9.01 defines “in need of care and treatment” as having a mental illness “for 
which in-patient . . . treatment is appropriate.” Id. § 9.01. 
 85. See id. § 9.17(a). 
 86. See id. § 9.17(b). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. § 9.25(a). 
 89. See id. § 9.19. 
 90. Id. § 9.13(a). 
 91. Id.; see also Samuel M. Leaf, How Voluntary Is the Voluntary Commitment 
of Minors? Disparities in the Treatment of Children and Adults Under New York’s 
Civil Commitment Law, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1687, 1716–17 (1996) (arguing that 
GROENDYK_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:50 PM 
564 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
A voluntary patient is subject to many of the same procedural 
requirements as an informal patient, including entitlement to notice 
of possible conversion to involuntary status92 and annual reevaluation 
for suitability and willingness.93  Additionally, a voluntary patient’s 
medical records, including treatment information specified by Section 
33.13, must be forwarded to MHLS within five days of admission.94  
This increased oversight is presumably in place because voluntary 
patients, unlike informal patients, are not free to leave the hospital at 
will, but must submit written notice of their “desire to leave.”95  The 
hospital director may then retain the patient for up to seventy-two 
hours to apply for an order for retention, which the patient may 
contest at a hearing set within three days of the director’s 
application.96  If the hearing court finds that the patient is “in need of 
retention for involuntary care,” a sixty-day retention order issues, and 
the patient’s status is converted to involuntary.97 
2. Involuntary Commitment 
Involuntary status can come about through a retention order and 
change of status following the director’s refusal to discharge a 
voluntary patient, through an emergency commitment for immediate 
observation,98 or through a non-emergency involuntary commitment.99  
Any of eleven enumerated parties,100 including a family member, 
treating psychiatrist, or person residing with the prospective 
committee can apply to a hospital to initiate a non-emergency 
involuntary commitment.101  Within ten days of this application, two 
physicians must examine the committee and certify that he or she is 
 
Sections 9.13 and 9.27 leave enormous power to parents to unnecessarily commit 
their children). 
 92. Id. § 9.17(a). 
 93. Id. § 9.25(a). 
 94. Id. § 9.11. 
 95. Id. § 9.13(b). 
 96. Id.  This hearing is not automatic; if the patient does not request it within five 
days of the application, a six-month retention order may be issued uncontested. See 
id. § 9.33(b). 
 97. Id.  This order must be issued pursuant to the procedure for retaining an 
involuntary committee provided in § 9.33(a), described in Part I.B.4 infra. 
 98. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 99. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(a). 
 100. Id. § 9.27(b). 
 101. Id. § 9.27(a); see also § 9.27(c) (application must contain statement of facts 
upon which allegation of mental illness and need for care and treatment are based, 
and is executed under penalty of perjury). 
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mentally ill and “in need of involuntary care and treatment.”102  This 
standard (the “involuntary standard”), while higher than the “care 
and treatment” standard for voluntary commitment,103 does not 
explicitly require a finding of dangerousness.104  Before certifying the 
need for involuntary treatment, both examining physicians are under 
a statutory duty to “consider” less restrictive alternatives and, if 
possible, to consult with any psychiatrist who has previously treated 
the potential committee.105  After certification of the application, 
either examining physician can direct police officers to transport the 
potential committee to the hospital for further evaluation, and may 
request ambulance service for this purpose.106  Before final admission 
to the hospital, a third physician must examine the potential 
committee to confirm that he or she meets the involuntary standard.107  
After final admission, the committee can be held for a maximum of 
sixty days, at which time the hospital must either grant discharge or 
apply for a retention order.108  Written notice of involuntary 
admission must be given “forthwith” to MHLS and to the 
committee’s nearest known relative.109 
Two aspects of the non-emergency involuntary commitment 
procedure warrant particular mention.  First, at no point during the 
commitment process—application, certification, and admission—is a 
judge or non-physician fact-finder involved.  A psychiatrist can make 
the application, two more psychiatrists can certify it, and a fourth can 
 
 102. Id. § 9.27(a) (emphasis added).  This examination can be conducted “jointly” 
by both certifying physicians. Id. 
 103. Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 104. The statute defines the involuntary care and treatment standard as requiring 
that the patient “has a mental illness for which care and treatment as a patient in a 
mental hospital is essential to such person’s welfare and whose judgment is so 
impaired that he is unable to understand the need for such care and treatment.” Id. § 
9.01.  In order to square this standard with O’Connor, New York courts have read 
dangerousness into the statute. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Brian H., 
857 N.Y.S.2d 530, 533 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2008); In re Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359, 
364–65 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1983); Scopes v. Shah, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (App. Div. 
3d Dep’t 1977); see also Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(finding that Section 9.27, as narrowed by New York state courts, withstood a due 
process overbreadth challenge). 
 105. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(d). 
 106. See id. § 9.27(i). 
 107. See id. § 9.27(e). 
 108. See id. § 9.33(a).  Involuntary committees can also be converted to voluntary 
status at the hospital’s discretion, § 9.23(a), provided that MHLS is notified of the 
conversion.  Any committee so converted may challenge the conversion at a hearing. 
See § 9.23(b). 
 109. See id. § 9.29. 
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confirm admission, before the committee has a chance to request 
judicial intervention.  Second, although state courts have read a 
“substantial threat of harm to self or others” element into the 
statutory “involuntary commitment” standard, the plain language of 
Article 9 does not require one.  Neither the statute nor the courts 
specify the severity or imminence of the harm that needs to be 
threatened, or whether the threat needs to be manifested by any 
objective evidence beyond a psychiatric prognosis.110 
3. Emergency Commitment 
In addition to standard voluntary and involuntary commitments, 
Article 9 permits emergency admission for “immediate observation, 
care, and treatment”111 in either an ordinary psychiatric facility112 or a 
CPEP.113  Emergency commitments do not require an application, and 
can be effected by any psychiatrist in an OMH-licensed facility,114 or 
any hospital director,115 police officer,116 mobile crisis outreach team,117 
or through a civil court order,118 upon a finding that an individual 
 
 110. See, e.g., Scopes v. Shah, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1977) 
(expressly disclaiming the need for an “overt act” to establish the threat of harm). 
 111. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39.  Emergency commitments  also can be 
effected by application of a director or his designee, using the emergency standard. 
See id. § 9.37(a).  In counties with fewer than 200,000 residents, this designee may be 
either a physician or a certified social worker. See id. § 9.37(c). 
 112. A facility must receive special certification from the OMH to receive 
emergency or CPEP committees. See id. §§ 9.39(a), 9.40(a).  There are currently 
nineteen hospitals in New York State certified by OMH to receive CPEP committees 
under § 9.40, ten of which, including Bellevue, are in New York City. See N.Y. STATE 
OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 10 OF NEW YORK STATE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (2008), 
available at http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/statistics/forensic/report.pdf. 
 113. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.40(a). 
 114. See id. § 9.55. 
 115. See id. § 9.57. 
 116. See id. § 9.41.  Police officers who determine that a person is suffering from 
mental illness “likely to result in serious harm” to self or others are authorized to 
detain and transport such person pending psychiatric examination. See id.; see also 
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. McMahon, 279 F. Supp. 2d 158, 168–69 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), 
aff’d, 124 F. App’x 674 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Section 9.41 police “pick ups” are 
functionally arrests, requiring Miranda warnings and allowing criminal background 
checks). 
 117. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.58(a). 
 118. See id. § 9.43. 
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meets a heightened “emergency” standard of dangerousness.119  
Within forty-eight hours of initial admission120 a second physician 
must examine the committee and confirm that the emergency 
standard is satisfied.121  After confirmation, the committee may be 
retained for up to fifteen days, at which point he must be either 
discharged or converted to non-emergency involuntary status through 
the standard involuntary procedure.122  At any time following 
confirmation, the committee, any friend or relative, or MHLS may 
demand a hearing, which must be granted within five days.123  If the 
hearing court finds that the emergency standard is met, it may issue a 
retention order for the remainder of the fifteen-day commitment—
this order is considered a finding of “reasonable cause” but not an 
adjudication that the committee is mentally ill.124 
Admission to a CPEP functions similarly to standard emergency 
commitment in that it uses the same standard125 and the same range of 
authorized actors initiate the admission, but it differs from emergency 
commitment in that a prospective committee may be held for 
observation for up to six hours before a psychiatrist examines him.126  
If the initial psychiatrist deems that commitment to a CPEP is 
appropriate, the committee may be held for up to twenty-four hours 
before confirmation by another psychiatrist and transfer to an 
 
 119. See id. § 9.39(a).  The emergency standard requires a finding that the 
prospective committee (1) suffers from a mental illness that is (2) likely to result in 
serious harm to himself or others. See id.  “Likelihood of serious harm” is defined as 
(1) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person as manifested by threats 
of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct 
demonstrating that the person is dangerous to himself or herself, or (2) a 
substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by 
homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in 
reasonable fear of serious physical harm. 
Id. § 9.01. 
 120. As in a non-emergency involuntary commitment, notice of rights and status 
must be given to the committee, MHLS, and the committee’s next relative 
immediately upon admission. Id. § 9.39(a). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. § 9.39(b).  Standard Section 9.27 procedure is described in Part I.B.2 
supra.  If a patient is converted from emergency to involuntary status, their date of 
admission for the purposes of the sixty-day involuntary admission period is calculated 
from the date of initial admission, rather than conversion. Id. § 9.39(b). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. § 9.40(b).  The “likelihood of serious harm” requirement is the same, 
but the physician must conclude that the committee is in particular need of CPEP, 
rather than standard emergency admission. Id. 
 126. See id. 
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extended observation bed.127  The maximum “extended observation” 
period in a CPEP is seventy-two hours, after which time the 
committee must be discharged or converted to standard emergency128 
or non-emergency involuntary status.129 
The emergency standard is the highest threshold of dangerousness 
required under Article 9.130  It differs from the lower involuntary 
standard in three important respects.  First, it explicitly specifies the 
need for a finding of harm to self or others, tracking the O’Connor 
standard.131  Second, it specifies the severity of the threat, although it 
does not specify imminence.  Third, it requires the threat to be 
manifested by some objective, overt act by the prospective 
committee, either in the form of a threat or attempt at suicide or 
violent behavior.  This requirement reduces the discretion of 
physicians to diagnose dangerousness by resting the legitimacy of an 
emergency commitment on factual evidence.  The need for a more 
objective standard is clear, given that such a broad range of actors can 
initiate a commitment, and the allegedly dangerous person can be 
initially committed for up to forty-eight hours on the assessment of a 
single physician.132 
4. Retention Orders, Release Hearings, and Other Procedural 
Protections 
New York law affords minimal procedural protections133 to all 
voluntarily and involuntarily committed patients by providing notice 
of status and rights,134 opportunities for hearings to present and rebut 
evidence, and opportunities for judicial review of all commitment 
 
 127. See id. § 9.40(c).  On transfer to an extended observation bed, notice and 
possibility of hearing must be given to the committee under the same procedure as 
Section 9.39. See also id. § 31.27(5) (defining “extended observation bed” as an 
inpatient bed in or adjacent to an emergency room where the committee’s “acute 
psychiatric symptoms” can be stabilized). 
 128. Id. § 9.40(a), (e). 
 129. Id. § 9.40(f). 
 130. Compare id. § 9.13(a) (“need for care and treatment”), with id. § 9.27(a) 
(“need for involuntary care and treatment”), and id. § 9.39(a) (“likely to result in 
serious harm”). 
 131. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). 
 132. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a). 
 133. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494–97 (1980), discussed supra in Part I.B.2. 
 134. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.07(a) (requiring notice of status and rights to 
hearing and counsel immediately upon admission or status conversion); id. § 9.07(b) 
(requiring notices of rights to be posted conspicuously throughout the facility in 
locations visible to all patients). 
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decisions,135 and goes beyond the constitutional minimum by 
providing state-funded counsel to indigent committees through 
MHLS.136  Within the initial sixty-day period of an involuntary 
commitment, no automatic hearing is triggered; however, a 
committee, their next relative, or MHLS can request one at any time 
after receiving notice of involuntary status.137  No involuntary 
commitment can continue beyond the initial sixty-day period without 
a court order of retention.138  Initial orders of retention can be for up 
to six months,139 subsequent orders may be for one year, then two 
years at a time.140  Provided the hearing court finds that the committee 
continues to meet the involuntary standard, two-year retention orders 
may continue to be granted indefinitely.141 
If a hearing is requested by or on behalf of a committee, it must be 
scheduled within five days.142  The committee, represented by MHLS 
or his own counsel, may present evidence to contest the validity of his 
involuntary status and cross-examine the hospital’s witness, usually a 
psychiatrist.143  If after hearing this evidence the court is satisfied that 
retention is appropriate, it may deny release and may order transfer 
to another facility; if not, it must order release.144  The court is also 
obliged to consider whether the committee has relatives willing and 
able to provide appropriate care, in which case it may order release 
 
 135. See id. § 9.31 (right to hearing regarding involuntary commitment status, 
requiring court to hear testimony); id. § 9.35 (right to review of order authorizing 
retention by another court, and appeal that court’s decision). 
 136. See, e.g., id. § 43.01(a) (waiving fees for patients unable to pay for services); 
id. § 15.1 (requiring, as part of the admission process, an assessment of “those social 
and economic factors which will impede and those which will facilitate a patient’s 
discharge”); see also id. § 47.01 (establishing the responsibilities of MHLS to provide 
legal services to all “patients or residents” of a mental facility or “persons alleged to 
be in need of care and treatment”); id. § 9.09 (requiring notice to MHLS within three 
days of any admission of a new patient or change of a patient’s status); id. § 9.11 
(requiring records of all involuntary patients to be forwarded to MHLS). 
 137. Id. § 9.31(a). 
 138. Id. § 9.33(a). 
 139. See id. § 9.33(b). 
 140. See id. § 9.33(d). 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. § 9.31(c). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id.  The facility need not release the patient immediately but must release 
them “forthwith.” See id. § 9.31(d). 
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into their custody.145  A committee denied release may be retained 
under involuntary status for the remainder of his term.146 
Both retention orders and denials of release can be reviewed.147  
Request of review must be made within thirty days, and may only be 
made by the committee or an immediate family member.148  The 
review procedure is much more robust than the standard release 
hearing, calling for both a supreme court justice (other than the judge 
or justice who issued the order) and a jury149 to try the questions of (1) 
mental illness and (2) need for involuntary retention.150  If the jury 
finds that both of these factual elements are shown by clear and 
convincing evidence,151 the committee is adjudged mentally ill and an 
order is issued to the hospital authorizing retention for the remainder 
of the term.152  The justice presiding over the review may, at his 
discretion and after a hearing, stay this order pending an appeal.153 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH ARTICLE 9, AND MORE PROTECTIVE 
ALTERNATIVES 
The preceding analysis of Article 9’s procedural labyrinth reveals 
that New York State law provides close to the federally mandated 
minimum of protection against erroneous commitment.  At key stages 
of the commitment process, the law devolves decision-making 
authority onto physicians and limits committees’ access to lay 
decision-makers and judges.  This Part will examine the extent to 
 
 145. See id. § 9.31(c). 
 146. See id.  A committee may be retained for thirty days after being denied 
release regardless of when their initial term ends; denial therefore may result in an 
extended term if release is requested with fewer than thirty days remaining on the 
retention term. See id. § 9.33(a). 
 147. See id. § 9.35. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Jury review may be waived. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. This standard of proof is not referenced in Article 9 but is mandated by 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 421 (1979). 
 152. See id.; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.35. 
 153. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.35.  Only the jury’s finding of a need for 
treatment may be appealed; the type of treatment administered and treatment 
classification (admission status) may not. See Jamie R. v. Consilvio, 6 N.Y.3d 138, 
147–48 (2006).  A committee who has been adjudged mentally ill and in need of 
treatment by the reviewing jury may not request another review pursuant to § 9.35 
during his retention term without establishing some change in legal or factual 
circumstances that would enable a fact finder to reconsider the previous reviewing 
fact finder’s verdict. See, e.g., In re Launcelot T., 668 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (Sup. Ct. 
1997). 
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which New York State has chosen to allocate the risk of over-
commitment onto its mentally disabled population.  Section A will 
focus on some key deficiencies built into Article 9.  Section B will 
survey more protective alternative civil commitment procedures that 
other jurisdictions have adopted, noting instances where the Second 
Circuit has heard challenges to Article 9 and declined to find 
alternative procedural protections necessary to the law’s survival. 
A. Delegated Discretion—the Problem with Article 9 
Article 9 incorporates the basic procedural requirements for 
involuntary commitment under Vitek v. Jones by providing notice of 
rights and status, allowing committees to seek judicial review of both 
retention orders and demands for early release, requiring notice to 
MHLS of all hearings and status changes, and granting MHLS 
significant power to request hearings on committees’ behalf.154  
Facilitating adversary hearings ostensibly introduces objective, non-
medical decision-makers into the commitment process.  Nevertheless, 
even as read by state courts to include a dangerousness requirement, 
New York law treads close to the constitutional boundaries of 
involuntary commitment.  Article 9 sets exceedingly broad standards 
for commitment, widening the population of New Yorkers who might 
qualify as “in need of involuntary care and treatment” and delegating 
enormous power to physicians, both as gatekeepers (by controlling 
initial admission) and as expert witnesses in hearings for retention.  
Because judges tend to defer to their medical expertise,155 a 
psychiatrist’s diagnosis can provide all the evidence necessary to 
satisfy the legal “dangerousness” standard.  Article 9 does little to 
restrict this discretion; thus, to whatever extent psychiatrists tend to 
erroneously predict dangerousness or misdiagnose patients, New 
York errs on the side of over-commitment.  Because only the 
mentally disabled are eligible for commitment, this burden falls 
entirely on them. 
 
 154. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that 
the Article 9 meets Vitek’s “constitutional minima” because of its “elaborate” notice 
and hearing provisions). 
 155. See Brooks, supra note 21, at 284–85 nn.138–39 (describing judges’ deference 
to clinical testimony, citing a variety of studies showing that judges defer to 
psychiatric recommendations between ninety and one hundred percent of the time); 
see also William Hoffman Pincus, Note, Civil Commitment and the “Great 
Confinement” Revisited: Straightjacketing Individual Rights Stifling Culture, 36 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1769, 1806–07 (1995) (citing a similar study). 
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Other states have chosen to err on the side of under-commitment.  
In recognition of the need to provide more procedural protections—
such as those under criminal law—to their disabled populations, some 
state legislatures have enacted stricter commitment statutes, 
incorporating higher burdens of proof and standards of 
dangerousness or requiring objective evidence, rather than mere 
diagnosis, to establish the need for commitment.  State and federal 
courts have adopted similar rights-protective measures through 
judicial doctrines.  The next section will examine these measures in 
comparison with New York’s commitment law, starting with a 
foundational federal case, Lessard v. Schmidt.156 
B. More Protective Alternatives 
As the Supreme Court has defined, involuntary civil commitment 
laws must strike two important balances, both of which allocate 
burdens between the State and the mentally disabled individual: first, 
they must set a substantive definition of “dangerousness” that 
determines what particular evidence must be produced to support a 
commitment, defining the class of “dangerous” individuals;157 second, 
they must set a burden of proof, allocating the risk of an erroneous 
“dangerous” classification.158  Since these broad guidelines were first 
enunciated in the 1970s, both the Supreme Court159 and academic 
commentators160 have consistently noted that, when striking these 
balances, courts and legislatures must account for the role that 
psychologists and clinical testimony will play in establishing mental 
illness and dangerousness.  A vague definition of “danger to self or 
 
 156. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 
(1974), reinstated and enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other 
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
 157. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), discussed supra notes 27–41 
and accompanying text. 
 158. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979), discussed supra notes 42-56 
and accompanying text. 
 159. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495–96 (1980) (recognizing that “[t]he 
question whether an individual is mentally ill” and requires treatment “turns on the 
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and 
psychologists,” but that “[t]he medical nature of the inquiry . . . does not justify 
dispensing with due process requirements” including adversary hearings before a 
neutral fact-finder). 
 160. See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: 
Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental 
Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329 (1992) (noting a legal tendency to delegate 
decisionmaking to mental health professionals). 
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others” or lack of a requirement that dangerousness must be 
established by any objective evidence (such as an overt act) may 
allow commitment based solely on the clinical testimony of one or 
two examining psychologists.161  To cut back on that delegation of 
discretion, jurisdictions outside New York have implemented a 
variety of protective measures to shift fact-finding to judicial, rather 
than clinical, decision-makers.162  These measures include (1) 
mandatory, rather than optional, judicial review of all non-emergency 
commitments; (2) elevated standards of proof; (3) more specific 
standards of “dangerousness,” including requirements relating to 
likelihood, severity and imminence of potential harm; and (4) 
requiring objective evidence in addition to clinical opinion, such as a 
recent overt act, to establish dangerousness.  This Part considers each 
in turn. 
1. Automatic Hearings 
Lessard v. Schmidt,163 one of the first cases to overturn a state’s 
commitment statute on due process grounds, recognized that the 
quasi-criminal nature of involuntary commitment meant it could only 
be accomplished through an adversarial hearing.164  The Lessard court 
reasoned that because the liberty interests at stake in a civil 
commitment are analogous to those at stake in a criminal 
prosecution,165 neither could be accomplished without a prior 
 
 161. See Brooks, supra note 21, at 293 (“[I]n the absence of statutory language or a 
judicial opinion clarifying the meaning of ‘danger,’ a clinician can interpret any threat 
to cause harm as creating a danger, regardless of the remoteness of the threat.”); see 
also Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 516 (D. Neb. 1975) (finding that an overly 
vague commitment statute “combine[d] the investigative, prosecutorial, and 
adjudicative functions in one authority and denie[d] the subject due process of law”). 
 162. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: 
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 445 (1992) 
(discussing the respective abilities of judicial and clinical authorities to be “neutral 
factfinders,” and concluding that clinical authorities tend to be more prone to bias).  
The problem of commitment bias among psychiatric professionals is especially 
troubling given the demonstrated deference afforded to clinical testimony by judges. 
See supra note 153; infra Part II.B.4. 
 163. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
 164. See id. at 1088–89 (dismissing “the civil-criminal distinction” between 
deprivations of liberty). 
 165. See id. at 1089–90 (identifying loss of civil rights, hazards of 
institutionalization, and stigma as implicated interests).  In its discussion of the 
consequences that could follow from even a brief erroneous commitment, the court 
cites testimony that “in the job market, it is better to be an ex-felon than [an] ex-
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hearing.166  Although the Court recognized that temporary emergency 
confinement could be necessary in some circumstances, it set a 48-
hour time limit on such commitments,167 and held categorically that 
commitment for any longer period “cannot be permitted under our 
Constitution without a hearing.”168  This unconditional language is 
understandable in the context of the analogy to criminal prosecutions; 
clearly, adjudication of guilt is a mandatory, not optional, prerequisite 
to incarceration.  Although the Supreme Court in Vitek did not 
explicitly require automatic hearings prior to commitment,169 other 
courts have followed Lessard in holding that hearings must be 
automatically triggered within a short time after any involuntary 
commitment.170  State legislatures have imposed similar requirements 
by statute.171 
Article 9 allows commitment for up to sixty days without a hearing, 
unless MHLS, the committee, or, in some cases, a family member 
requests one.172  If a committee is unwilling or unable to request a 
hearing, by reason of his illness or simple mistrust of the system, and 
MHLS fails or does not have the resources to request a hearing on his 
behalf, his liberty is in the hands of the physicians until the mandatory 
retention hearing is triggered.  This state of affairs amounts to a 
presumption that the committed individual has waived the right to a 
hearing and acquiesces to treatment until he objects.  Nevertheless, 
when the Second Circuit addressed Article 9’s hearing provisions in 
Project Release,173 it held that the statute’s lack of an automatic 
 
patient.” See id. at 1089 (citing Hearings Before S. Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Rights, 91st Cong. 284 (1970) (statement of Bruce J. Ennis, ACLU)). 
 166. See id. at 1091. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. (emphasis added). 
 169. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (holding only that adversary 
hearings must be held sufficiently after notice to let the prospective committee 
prepare). 
 170. See, e.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983, 994 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (seven-day 
limit for a probable cause hearing), aff’d, 657 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 1981); Kendall 
v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 419 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (full hearing within twenty-one days); 
Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975) (finding Nebraska’s civil 
commitment statute deficient in “failing to require a full and formal hearing on the 
necessity for commitment to be held within a reasonable time,” and setting a 
fourteen-day limit (emphasis added)). 
 171. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 n.14 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 
state statutes that require prompt, automatic hearings). 
 172. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31(a) (McKinney 2011), discussed supra in 
Part I.B.4. 
 173. 722 F.2d 960. 
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preliminary hearing satisfied due process.174  This holding was based 
partly on a rejection of the analogy between civil and criminal 
confinement,175 and partly on an optimistic assessment that the “layers 
of professional review” by physicians would be sufficient to screen 
out erroneous commitments even without automatic judicial 
intervention.176  As this Note177 will demonstrate, this assessment may 
place too much confidence in the ability of physicians to serve as 
objective fact-finders. 
2. Elevated Standards of Proof 
Lessard also held that the state must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt all facts necessary to show that an individual is mentally ill and 
dangerous.178  The Supreme Court in Addington subsequently held 
that a clear and convincing standard could satisfy minimum due 
process;179 however, at least one state elected to impose the higher 
standard.180  The Court has explicitly condoned this practice as within 
states’ discretion.181  Some commentators have suggested that the 
Court should reconsider the Addington minimum in light of 
developments in diagnostic abilities;182 regardless, it is fully within the 
legislative power of New York State to raise the standard and allocate 
 
 174. See id. at 973–74. 
 175. See id. at 974–75 (“We acknowledge the deprivation of liberty involved in 
involuntary civil commitment, but we are not prepared to invoke the same 
procedural standards required in the criminal context.”). 
 176. See id. at 975 (finding that notice to relatives, combined with the availability 
of a hearing, was sufficient). 
 177. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 178. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on 
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated and enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (D. 
Wis. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 
1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
 179. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text. 
 180. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.076(2) (West 2011); see also Messer v. 
Roney, 772 S.W.2d 648, 649–50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (justifying the higher standard of 
proof by analogy between the loss of liberty in civil and criminal confinements). 
 181. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333 (1993) (holding that Kentucky statutes 
imposing a “reasonable doubt” standard for commitment of the mentally ill, but a 
“clear and convincing” standard for commitment of the mentally retarded, do not 
violate equal protection because the comparative difficulty in diagnosing mental 
illness, and more invasive treatment, provide a rational basis for allocating less of the 
risk of error to the mentally ill); id. at 341 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this case 
Kentucky has determined that the liberty of those alleged to be mentally ill is 
sufficiently precious that the State should assume the risk inherent in use of that 
higher standard.”). 
 182. See Tsesis, supra note 71, at 254–55. 
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less risk to its enormous disabled population.183  The Project Release 
court recognized this, but reiterated its reliance on Addington in 
refusing to equate civil and criminal confinement.184 
3. The Definition of “Danger” 
The O’Connor dangerousness standard reduced the discretion of 
legislatures to confine “inconvenient” individuals at will,185 but much 
of that reduction may be illusory to the extent that states can define 
what “dangerous” means or simply shift the discretion to commit into 
the hands of physicians.186  Most state civil commitment statutes 
provide a more specific standard than mere “danger.”187  These 
specifications tend to incorporate different “components of the 
dangerousness determination”: probability, imminence, and 
magnitude of harm.188  Stricter definitions of both danger and mental 
illness would require all three of these components to be statutorily 
defined—it would require, for example, a finding that danger is 
certain or reasonably certain, imminent, and that the resulting harm 
would be serious—but few states incorporate all three. 189  Article 9 
provides few substantive definitions, and notably leaves “mental 
illness” completely undefined.190  The emergency standard defines the 
 
 183. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 341 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this case 
Kentucky has determined that the liberty of those alleged to be mentally ill is 
sufficiently precious that the State should assume the risk inherent in use of that 
higher standard.”). 
 184. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 974–75 (2d Cir. 1983).  The 
Second Circuit cited the Addington Court’s observation that, because the mentally ill 
may be deprived of “needed medical treatment” by an erroneous failure to commit, 
the reasonable doubt standard could create too high a barrier to the State’s ability to 
forcibly administer that treatment. See id. 
 185. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 186. See Brooks, supra note 21, at 261–65 (arguing that, in part because of vague 
definitions of danger, the post-O’Connor “narrowing of commitment statutes failed 
to result in a decrease in the instances of commitment, which suggests that tighter 
standards and procedures have not been applied in practice”). 
 187. See People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 772–73 nn.4–8 (Colo. 1988) (surveying 
different states’ commitment standards). 
 188. See Brooks, supra note 21, at 265; cf. Christyne E. Ferris, Note, The Search 
for Due Process in Civil Commitment Hearings: How Procedural Realities Have 
Altered Substantive Standards, 61 VAND. L. REV. 959, 966–67 (2008) (identifying the 
three components as type, immediacy, and likelihood of danger). 
 189. See Ferris, supra note 188, at 967 (citing BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL 
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 61–64 (2005)). 
 190. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.01 (McKinney 2011); see also Christopher 
Slobogin, Rethinking Legally Relevant Mental Disorder, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 497, 
498 (2003) (arguing that mental disorder is “such a vacuous phrase that the law 
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degree (“serious”) and likelihood (“substantial risk”) of harm, but 
not its imminence.191  This absence of definition could be significant; 
under the existing standard a person diagnosed with any disorder that 
creates a long-term risk of dangerous behavior could be committed 
even if there is no evidence that he will commit a harmful act in the 
near future.  Even more problematic, the non-emergency involuntary 
standard doesn’t define any of the three guidelines, but requires only 
that a need for treatment be found.192  The addition of “risk of harm 
to self or others” to this standard in Scopes, which the Second Circuit 
found saved the standard from unconstitutional overbroadness,193 is 
similarly vague. 194  By comparison, other courts, including Lessard195 
and the Ninth Circuit,196 have rejected similarly vague state 
commitment standards as inadequate to justify a police power-based 
confinement.197  Oregon courts are similarly strict about how severe 
the threat to self must be to justify a parens patriae confinement.198  
As the Oregon cases demonstrate, meeting the higher substantive 
standard will generally require more evidence to be produced,199 
 
should consider dispensing with it” altogether and simply identify specific disorders 
for commitment purposes); cf. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxi (4th ed. 1994) (“[N]o definition adequately 
specifies the precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental disorder.’”). 
 191. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a). 
 192. See id. §§ 9.01, 9.27. 
 193. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973–74 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he 
New York State civil commitment scheme, considered as a whole and as interpreted 
in Scopes to include a showing of dangerousness, meets minimum due process 
standards . . . .”). 
 194. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the involuntary standard). 
 195. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on 
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated and enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. 
Wis. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 
1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (“[T]he state must bear the burden of proving that there is an 
extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to 
himself or others.” (emphasis added)).  The court goes on to define that the degree of 
harm must be “substantial.” Id. 
 196. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980) (overturning a state 
standard for failing to explicitly require a finding of imminence). 
 197. See id. (“[D]anger must be imminent to justify involuntary commitment.”). 
 198. See, e.g., State v. D.P., 144 P.3d 1044, 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (holding threat 
must be of serious harm to self “in the near future”). 
 199. See id. (overturning a commitment that had been based on past threats of self-
harm and reluctance to take antipsychotic medication, because the state had not 
carried its burden to introduce evidence of (1) a past pattern of destructive behavior 
and (2) that the pattern is beginning again); see also State v. L.P., 160 P.3d 634, 638 
(Or. Ct. App. 2007) (overturning a commitment based on “speculative or 
conjectural” evidence of imminence).  In both of these cases, the Oregon court found 
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placing a higher burden on the state and restricting a diagnostician’s 
ability to “shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any 
person he wishes.”200  Stricter definitions would thereby reduce the 
portion of the mentally disabled population who are eligible for 
involuntary commitment, and New York courts are free to implement 
them.201 
4. Procedural Standards—Objective Evidence 
In addition to substantive “dangerousness” definitions that 
determine what the state must prove in order to commit, procedural 
requirements may constrain how the state can meet its burden.202  
These procedural requirements entail evidentiary rules that either 
may be imposed explicitly by statute203 or implied by judicial 
doctrine.204  Most state commitment statutes, including Article 9, 
require clinical testimony to support a commitment.205  However, 
courts and commentators have long observed the general inability of 
prognostic clinical testimony alone to accurately predict 
dangerousness.206  This inability is partly a consequence of the inexact 
 
expert testimony by psychiatrists to be too equivocal to prove imminence by clear 
and convincing evidence; notably, the Oregon statute they were interpreting does not 
include an imminence requirement, but courts have implied one. See L.P., 160 P.3d at 
637 n.4. 
 200. See Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1094 (quoting Joseph M. Livermore et. al., On 
the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 80 (1968)). 
 201. See generally Slobogin, supra note 190, at 504 (“No less an authority than the 
U.S. Supreme Court has counseled that judges and legislatures, not psychiatrists or 
other mental health professionals, should define the scope of legally relevant mental 
disorder.” (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997))). 
 202. See Ferris, supra note 188, at 976 (describing how higher evidentiary burdens 
can increase the effectiveness of substantive “dangerousness” standards). 
 203. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(2) (2011) (requiring an “imminent 
threat” to be proven by “overt acts or omissions”); see also Alexander Scherr, 
Daubert & Danger: The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 43 n.210 (2003) (surveying state statutes that require overt acts). 
 204. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The proper standard is 
that which requires a finding of imminent and substantial danger as evidenced by a 
recent overt act, attempt, or threat.” (quoting Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 
(D. Haw. 1977))); see also Scherr, supra note 203, at 43–49 (surveying judicial 
doctrines requiring various “overt” and “recent overt” act requirements to support 
findings of dangerousness). 
 205. See Scherr, supra note 203, at 37–40 (surveying statutes and judicial doctrines 
requiring expert testimony at commitment hearings). 
 206. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (“It is precisely the subtleties 
and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses that justify the requirement of adversary 
hearings.”) (quotations omitted); see also Scherr, supra note 203, at 40–41 
(concluding that most courts find expert diagnosis alone insufficient to justify 
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nature of diagnosis itself; medical science in its current state simply is 
not equipped to foresee an individual’s future behavior.  It may also 
owe to professional biases inherent to psychiatrists, who tend to face 
strong incentives to over-commit disabled individuals who come 
under their care.207  These incentives stem from a combination of 
stereotyping,208 fear of liability,209 and treatment bias.210  Recognizing 
these strong incentives, other states have imposed evidentiary 
burdens to restrict physicians’ discretion and shift commitment 
decisions to non-physician fact-finders, namely juries and judges. 
Evidentiary burdens take different forms, but generally consist of 
some additional fact or facts that must be established to provide an 
objective supplement to clinical testimony.211  Commentators have 
proposed requiring actuarial evidence or “structured” clinical 
evaluation to support the traditional “unstructured” clinical 
testimony.212  More commonly, state legislatures and courts will 
 
commitment); Brooks, supra note 21, at 269 (“Authorities in legal and medical 
journals have detailed, with much empirical support, that psychiatrists lack the ability 
to assess danger proficiently.  This lack of skill has resulted in mental health 
professionals overpredicting instances of harmful behavior.”); Phyllis Coleman & 
Ronald A. Shellow, Suicide: Unpredictable and Unavoidable—Proposed Guidelines 
to Provide Rational Test for Physician’s Liability, 71 NEB. L. REV. 643, 644 (1992) 
(“[P]redictions of the likelihood a specific individual will commit suicide are wrong 
far more often than they are right.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 1, at 28–29 (detailing various motivations 
physicians have to over-commit, including moral concerns and stereotyping). 
 208. See id.; see also Bersoff, supra note 160, at 336–37 (discussing how heuristic 
reasoning that characterizes professional assessments of dangerous may cause 
professional physicians to be “more susceptible to error than . . . trainees and 
sometimes even lay decisionmakers”); Michael Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 
373, 393–96 (1992) (detailing different “sanist” tropes, such as the one that a refusal 
to take antipsychotic medication indicates dangerousness). 
 209. See Michael Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New 
Directions for the 1990’s, 16 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 57–58, 61–62 (1992) (describing 
how “litigaphobia” may cause psychiatrists to prefer to err on the side of committing 
potentially dangerous individuals). 
 210. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 28–29; see also Brooks, supra note 21, at 265 
(“[W]hen psychiatrists learn the legal system imposes few constraints on their clinical 
decision-making, they tend to disregard the law and permit their clinical judgment to 
dictate how they will act.”); Coleman & Shellow, supra note 206, at 654 (noting that, 
even using the most accurate available predictive models, “the physician will predict 
suicide twenty-five times for every death that will occur”). 
 211. See Scherr, supra note 203, at 41. 
 212. See id. at 15–22 (describing the relative benefits of clinical assessments, which 
rely purely on psychiatrists’ professional judgment, and actuarial models, which have 
been empirically shown to be more accurate as applied to groups but not individuals, 
and advocating that actuarial predictors should be incorporated into clinical 
assessments to provide an improved “structured clinical” testimony to establish 
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require objective evidence in the form of an “overt” or “recent” act 
demonstrating dangerousness.213  Article 9’s involuntary standard, 
even as read by Scopes, does not explicitly require an overt act, and 
the Project Release court declined to require one.214  The Second 
Circuit’s holding in a subsequent case, Rodriguez v. City of New 
York,215 may effectively imply an overt act requirement into the 
standard in some cases by requiring that diagnoses meet with 
“standards generally accepted by the medical community” in order to 
satisfy due process.216  Because compliance with “standards generally 
accepted by the medical community” is a question of fact, plaintiffs 
may introduce testimony to show that diagnostic standards require 
objective, overt evidence of danger to support a diagnosis.217  In 
general, however, neither the courts nor the legislature in New York 
have required objective evidence of dangerousness as a blanket 
prerequisite to involuntary commitment. 
The comparison with rights-protective devices that other states’ 
civil commitment laws employ reveals that New York has chosen to 
delegate fact finding to physicians and allocate the risk of erroneous 
commitment to the mentally disabled population to the maximum 
extent the O’Connor/Addington framework allows.  In the absence of 
more meaningful substantive and procedural protections, erroneously 
committed individuals are left to enforce their rights ex post by 
bringing lawsuits against physicians.  As Part III will demonstrate, this 
form of enforcement has significant limitations, but it may also be a 
productive way to cut against physicians’ incentives to over-commit 
 
dangerousness).  Professor Scherr goes on to conclude that predictive psychiatric 
testimony should still be admitted in commitment hearings, but should be subjected 
to a Daubert-like test for reliability that would likely require some incorporation of 
objective or actuarial criteria. See id. at 88–89. 
 213. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text; see also Project Release v. 
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting a split among federal courts on 
whether an overt act must be shown in order to satisfy O’Connor). 
 214. See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 974. 
 215. 72 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 216. See id. at 1062 (“In thus declining [in Project Release] to find the statutory 
scheme as a whole facially invalid in the absence of an overt-act requirement, we did 
not purport to hold that due process would never impose an overt-act requirement 
with respect to any particular section of the statute as applied.” (emphasis added)). 
 217. See Monaco v. Hogan, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (plaintiffs 
introduced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact that psychiatrists 
performing evaluations without considering recent overt acts failed to comport with 
“standards generally accepted by the medical community”). 
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and indirectly shape a “limiting norm” on the state’s power to 
commit.218 
III.  CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARY 
TO ARTICLE 9 
In the absence of more protective state law, wrongly committed 
New Yorkers are left to litigate the adequacy of the substantive and 
procedural standards under which they were committed in federal 
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.219  This case-by-case enforcement for damages cannot 
change the law the way a facial challenge would, but it does give fact 
finders the chance to examine Article 9’s standards as applied.  In 
addition to allowing committees to vindicate their rights individually, 
these cases set precedent that may indirectly shape the way physicians 
apply the standards in the future. 
A. Potential Benefits of Case-by-Case Litigation 
Civil rights suits for damages provide an incentive to individual 
committees, and (thanks to fee-shifting statutes)220 to private 
attorneys, to litigate the constitutionality of particular involuntary 
commitments after the fact.  This approach can compensate 
individuals who are swept into the system under Article ’9’s 
overbroad standard without requiring action by the legislature or any 
narrowing of the legislature’s discretion by federal courts.  Although 
this strategy does not change the scope of physicians’ discretion under 
the letter of Article 9, it does create the prospect that the methods 
used to diagnose “danger to self or others” will be called into 
question in a post-commitment lawsuit.  Plaintiffs and private 
attorneys can present competing expert testimony as to what 
constitutes “danger” and what kind and quality of evidence can be 
used to establish “danger.”221  This kind of “battle of experts” comes 
 
 218. See James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 422–23 (2003) (noting the role of constitutional tort 
actions in forming substantive norms relating “the government’s ability to injure”). 
 219. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits 
of the services, programs, or activities of a pubic entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”). 
 220. See id. §§ 1988(b), 12205 (allowing courts to award fees to the “prevailing 
party” in an action commenced pursuant to § 1983 and § 12132, respectively). 
 221. See Rodriguez v. New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1063 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A rational 
jury could, for example, reject the proposition that it is consistent with the generally 
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much closer to the “adversarial” process that the Supreme Court 
endorsed in Vitek222 than the usual Article 9 hearing in which one 
doctor, employed by the hospital petitioning for retention,223 gives all 
the medical testimony.  Allowing a non-physician fact finder to 
choose between a plaintiff’s and a defendant’s expert’s definition of 
“danger” combats the influence of physicians’ inherent biases.  It also 
makes the adequacy of any particular diagnosis an open question, 
which gives physicians an incentive to lean toward the “highest 
common denominator” of diagnostic methods—in other words, the 
fear of liability could encourage physicians to use the strictest 
methods and highest standards of “danger” that any expert might 
credibly espouse at a subsequent trial.  Fear of a wider range of post-
commitment liability could therefore create ex ante incentives to 
exercise more care (including longer examinations, different 
definitions of “conduct” or “serious harm,” etc.) to cut against the 
many incentives to over-commit.224 
While the Second Circuit has rejected facial challenges to Article 
9’s standards,225 it has been more open than other courts of appeals to 
allowing constitutional claims to proceed against physicians and 
hospitals that make erroneous commitments.226  In Rodriguez v. City 
of New York, the Second Circuit adopted an objective professional 
standard of care for psychiatrists making involuntary commitments.227  
The court allowed a § 1983 claim to proceed to trial where the 
plaintiff, Rodriguez, had produced expert testimony that her 
purportedly suicidal thoughts could not constitute “conduct”228 
indicating danger to self, and that the hospital’s physician had spent 
insufficient time with Rodriguez to have made a meaningful 
 
accepted standards of the medical profession to order an emergency involuntary 
commitment on the basis of ‘vague ideation’ . . . .”). 
 222. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980); supra Part I.A.2. 
 223. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31(c); supra notes 142–46 and accompanying 
text. 
 224. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 225. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 226. Compare Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1066 (allowing a claim to proceed to trial to 
determine based on expert testimony whether physician’s conduct deviated from 
professional standards), with Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 175 
(3d Cir. 2004) (upholding a grant of summary judgment on a similar claim because 
physician’s conduct did not “shock the conscience” as a mater of law). 
 227. See Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1065; see also Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 144 
(2d Cir. 2010) (reaffirming Rodriguez). 
 228. See Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1057. 
GROENDYK_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:50 PM 
2012] NY’S INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT LAW 583 
diagnosis.229  Because her expert considered the defendant’s brief 
examination and broad definition of “conduct” to have “deviated 
substantially” from the standards of the medical community, the court 
held that a jury was competent to decide that the deviation 
constituted a violation of her rights under substantive due process.230 
In a civil rights suit under Rodriguez, the proper “standard of the 
medical community” is a triable question of fact, which at least partly 
eliminates physicians’ discretion to define danger by shifting the 
question to a “battle of the experts.”  Other courts have reduced this 
discretion-checking potential by adopting a “shocks the conscience” 
standard under which a committing physician’s conduct must be 
egregious or malicious, rather than professionally subpar, to be 
actionable.231  This is plainly a much higher evidentiary bar, with the 
consequence that claims are more likely to fail early on summary 
judgment.  Notably, however, the Second Circuit recently reaffirmed 
the Rodriguez standard, leaving liability for physicians applying 
Article 9 as a legitimate possibility.232 
B. Limitations on Case-by-Case Litigation 
The obvious drawback to § 1983 and ADA Title II suits is that, for 
individuals, these suits can provide only a remedy and do not offer 
preemptive protection.  The specter of liability may indirectly impact 
physicians’ conduct generally, but case-by-case litigation can never 
have the same protective effect as an elevated legal standard of 
danger or burden of proof that applies in all cases.  For individual 
civil rights claimants like Ms. Rodriguez, § 1983 can provide 
vindication but not protection. 
Another, more practical barrier to suits against psychiatrists may 
be the necessity of providing expert testimony.  No cost-shifting 
statute exists for experts under § 1983;233 nevertheless, expert 
evidence is generally necessary to create a triable issue of fact under 
 
 229. Id. at 1056. 
 230. See id. at 1064; see also Jensen v. Lane County, 312 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 
2002) (importing the Rodriguez analysis). 
 231. See Benn, 371 F.3d at 175 (upholding a grant of summary judgment under a 
“shocks the conscience” test); James v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., No. 97-
5157, 1998 WL 66315, at *7 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998) (same). 
 232. See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 144 (citing Benn and James but concluding that “the 
reasoning of those cases does not persuade us that Rodriguez is no longer good 
law”). 
 233. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2006). 
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the Rodriguez standard.234  Plaintiffs wishing to bring a civil rights 
claim against a hospital must find not only a lawyer willing to 
represent them, but one with the resources to pay an expert witness. 
Finally, it should be noted that New York State has a practice of 
billing and aggressively countersuing patients who sue its hospitals, 
usually to collect medical bills that can often be enormous.235  Even if 
an ex-patient wins her erroneous commitment suit, she could end up 
stuck with medical bills that outweigh her award. 
CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing examination of Article 9 demonstrates, New 
York’s legislature has chosen to provide minimal constitutional 
protection to its mentally disabled population’s right to be free from 
unnecessary commitment.  The Supreme Court’s framework for due 
process protection, including the broad standards for quality and 
quantity of proof of “danger” that can justify an involuntary 
commitment, leaves space for states to delegate commitment 
authority to physicians.  New York’s legislature has chosen to do so to 
a much higher degree than some other states, despite the large 
percentage of New Yorkers who could potentially be subject to 
“mentally disabled” status.236  In particular, by failing to identify what 
degree of severity or imminence of harm constitutes “danger to self 
or others” and by declining to require any quantum of objective 
evidence of mental illness (in the form of an overt act, for example), 
Article 9’s commitment standards leave patients’ freedom in the 
hands of a small group of physicians and potentially at the mercy of 
institutional bias.  So far the Second Circuit,  the controlling federal 
jurisdiction for New York, has been reluctant to directly question 
Article 9, but has shown a greater willingness than other courts to 
indirectly affect the commitment standard by leaving psychiatrists 
open to constitutional tort claims.  This can work to patients’ 
advantage, and New York lawyers advocating for the mentally 
 
 234. See Olivier v. Robert L. Yaeger Mental Health Ctr., 398 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir. 
2005) (finding that jury was not competent to assess whether commitment deviated 
substantially from the standards of the medical community without expert 
testimony); cf. id. at 192 (Raggi, C.J., dissenting) (“I do not understand the court 
today to be holding that expert testimony is an absolute prerequisite to establishing a 
due process challenge to involuntary commitment.”). 
 235. See Allison Leigh Cowan, Hospitals Send Bill if Mental Patients Win Suits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/25/nyregion/ 
25damages.html. 
 236. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. 
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disabled should pursue civil rights suits in order to add a second line 
of defense to the efforts of Mental Hygiene Legal Services.  Until the 
standards are tightened or medical science gets better at predicting 
violence, post-commitment § 1983 claims are the best way for New 
York’s mentally disabled population to protect itself from prejudice 
and medical overreach. 
 
